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If conventional instruments of strategic trade policy are unavailable, the system of foreign 
profit taxation and transfer price guidelines may serve as surrogate policy instruments. In this 
paper, I consider a model where firms from two countries compete with each other on a third 
market. I analyze optimal policy choices of the firms’ residence countries aiming at 
strategically manipulating the competitivity of their firms on the third market. I show that, as 
has recently been claimed, countries prefer the tax exemption system over the tax credit 
system if transfer prices for headquarter services to the affiliate are close to the headquarter’s 
variable cost and if the third country’s tax rate is low (i.e., if there is a large tax differential 
between both locations within the firm). However, if transfer prices are high and the tax rate 
in the third market country is sufficiently close to the residence country’s tax rate, I show that 
the tax credit system is an optimal tax policy choice for both countries. From a policy 
perspective, the view that the tax exemption system is generally the best policy response if 
domestic firms’ competitiveness is a policy goal has to be qualified. 
JEL-Code: H25, F23. 
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In recent decades, international trade agreements like GATT and supranational
institutions like the WTO and the EU have successfully reduced the level of tari⁄s
and production subsidies. Today, if countries want to strategically manipulate
the terms of trade of their trade-oriented ￿rms, they have to choose di⁄erent and
subtler means than outright subsidies or tari⁄s. One potential means to do so is
the tax system, especially the set of taxes on multinational ￿rms.
In this paper, I analyze the tax system￿ s scope and potential for strategic
trade purposes. I concentrate on two features of the tax system, the regime of
foreign pro￿t taxation and transfer price guidelines. The OECD recommends to
its members to choose between two regimes of foreign business income taxation,
the tax credit system where foreign income is taxed and foreign taxes are credited
against the domestic tax liability, and the tax exemption system where foreign
income is not taxed by the residence country. As the regime choice is likely to
a⁄ect the cost of production, it is relevant as a means of indirect strategic trade
policy. The same may be true for transfer price guidelines which are required
to determine locational income for tax purposes. The choice of transfer price
guidelines may serve the goal of e¢ ciency1 (not distort production choices) and
fairness (ensure a fair share of taxable income in all locations), but it may also be
used as an instrument for indirect strategic trade policy. If the two jurisdictions
under consideration di⁄er in tax rates, changing the transfer price a⁄ects the ￿rm￿ s
variable cost and, thus, its competitiveness. Of course, by choosing its set of
transfer price guidelines, a country will have to account for the multinational
trying to manipulate transfer prices for purpose of tax minimization.2
1The e¢ ciency related objective implies that transfer prices among related parties should not
be di⁄erent from market prices in transactions between unrelated parties. This arm￿ s length
principle is, however, often hard to apply, e.g. if such market transactions do not exist, and its
e¢ ciency properties crucially depend on the assumption of competitive markets. Moreover, even
if an arm￿ s length benchmark exists, its use may lead to distorted incentives within the ￿rm, as
Devereux & Keuschnigg (2009) point out.
2Pro￿t shifting by strategic use of transfer prices has been a major research topic in the
public ￿nance literature, see e.g. Huizinga & Laeven (2008) and, for a survey, Devereux (2007).
Direct evidence for strategic transfer pricing is given in Bernard and Weiner (1990), Clausing
(2003), Overesch (2006). Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) document that export prices of U.S.
multinationals for intra￿rm transactions are signi￿cantly lower than prices for the same good
sent to an arm￿ s length customer.
1The implications of the tax regime choice for the domestic ￿rms￿competitive-
ness has recently been in the focus of a lively debate.3 Several countries, among
them the United States and the United Kingdom, have reviewed their system of
foreign income taxation. The UK has already switched from the tax credit system
to the exemption system. The main argument in favour of exemption has been
- both in the UK and the US - that a tax on foreign income reduces the com-
petitiveness of domestic ￿rms on foreign markets. For instance, the O¢ ce of Tax
Policy at the U.S. Treasury Department (2007) states that ￿U.S. companies in-
creasingly su⁄er a competitive disadvantage. The U.S. business tax system imposes
a burden on on U.S. companies and U.S. workers by (...) burdening U.S. ￿rms
as they compete with other ￿rms in foreign markets.￿(p. i) As a consequence,
the O¢ ce recommends a switch to the exemption system.4 Similarly, the Co-
alition Agreement (2009) between the three governing parties in Germany states
that the government will stick to the exemption system in order to support the
competitiveness of German ￿rms.5
Transfer price guidelines have been to a lesser extent considered as a means
to a⁄ect the competitiveness of domestic ￿rms.6 However, as this paper argues,
the actual level of transfer prices is crucial for the properties of the tax credit
3Recent contributions include Desai & Hines (2003, 2004), Devereux (2008), Desai (2009),
Hines (2009), Becker & Fuest (2010). There is an extensive literature on the optimal taxation
of foreign pro￿ts building on the seminal work by Peggy Musgrave (nØe Richman, 1963, 1969).
For a short overview and discussion, the reader may refer to Mintz & Tulkens (1996) or Becker
(2009).
4Before switching to the exemption system, the British Treasury argued: ￿Business increas-
ingly operates in a global marketplace, where many of the UK￿ s competitors already operate forms
of an exemption regime, (...). The Government therefore believes it is now time to consider
again the case for exemption.￿ (HM Treasury and HM Revenue and Customs, 2007, p. 13)
And Devereux (2008) adds that ￿imposing a tax on worldwide income will, in general, raise the
required pre-tax rate of return, possibly giving the company a competitive disadvantage in for-
eign markets, and hence reducing the attractiveness of the residence country as a headquarters
location.￿ (p. 710)
5The Coalition Agreement (2009) says: ￿We will ensure our companies can remain competitive
internationally with our double taxation policies and thus, in principle, adhere to the exemption
method on foreign income.￿(p. 15)
6Even when, in 2002, the WTO ruled against the U.S. and forced the country to abolish legal
provisions that allowed U.S. multinationals to shift foreign income through tax havens, transfer
prices got only little scholarly attention from the competition perspective (see Rosenbaum &
Olson: U.S. Loses Trade Case to Europeans on O⁄shore Tax Havens, New York Times, January
15, 2002).
2system and exemption system in terms of e¢ ciency and competitiveness.7 Thus,
the arguments put forward in favor of exemption require some assumptions on the
level of transfer prices.
This paper considers the interaction of transfer price policies and the choice of
the regime of foreign pro￿t taxation in a strategic setting. It builds on a model in
the tradition of Brander & Spencer (1985) where ￿rms from two countries compete
with each other on a third market.8 As a crucial di⁄erence to Brander & Spencer
(1985), I assume that both ￿rms have production facilities in the third market
country which give rise to intra-￿rm trade. For tax purposes, transfer prices for
input goods received from the headquarter are required.9 The governments of the
residence countries (where the headquarters are) choose a tax on foreign income
and - eventually - a transfer price guideline, given the choices of the other country.
Then, ￿rms may choose to deviate from the guideline by setting their own, tax
minimizing transfer price.
The main results are the following. Firstly, if transfer prices are close to variable
costs at the headquarter, the optimal system of foreign income taxation is the
exemption system. This result con￿rms the claims of the exemption proponents,
but it has to be quali￿ed because it depends on the actual level of transfer prices.
Secondly, if transfer prices for headquarter services to the a¢ liate are su¢ ciently
high (e.g., to shift a fair amount of taxable income to the headquarter location),
the optimal system of foreign pro￿t taxation is the tax credit system. Thirdly, if
both countries autonomously choose the transfer price guidelines (and, thus, use
them as a means to strategically subsidize production), the exemption system is
optimal for low tax rates in the third market and the tax credit system for tax
rates close to the residence country￿ s tax rate. Fourthly, if the third country is
allowed to choose its tax rate, it will choose a tax rate low enough to trigger an
equilibrium where both residence countries choose the exemption system.
7Becker & Fuest (2009) provide an example how transfer price guidelines may be used stra-
tegically in tax competition. Becker & Loomer (2009) analyze a country￿ s incentive to use transfer
pricing via tax havens in order to improve the country￿ s terms of trade.
8Note that this setting di⁄ers substantially from the one in Bond & Samuelson (1989) who
also analyse strategic competition in systems of foreign pro￿t taxation.
9Note that I do not consider incentive e⁄ects of transfer pricing within the ￿rm, as in
Holmstrom and Tirole (1991), Elitzur & Mintz (1996) or Koethenbuerger (2010). I assume
that headquarters can perfectly control a¢ liates.
3It is important to note that these results crucially depend on the assumption of
an e⁄ective lack of suitable policy instruments: the availability of direct subsidies
or tari⁄s is ruled out. As a consequence, each policy choice is subject to a trade-
o⁄ between di⁄erent government goals. The choice of the system of foreign pro￿t
taxation has to account for the revenue implications and the tax e⁄ects on the
competitiveness of domestic ￿rms (and its market shares). Transfer price guidelines
are chosen weighing o⁄the loss in taxable income at the headquarter location and
their e⁄ect on the variable cost of production. If the restriction on the number of
available policy instruments is relaxed, e.g. if a direct production subsidy is allowed
for, the picture changes substantially. It is straightforward to show that the tax
exemption system would not be an optimal policy choice independent of the level
of transfer prices. Of course, the question may arise whether a situation in which
tax policy choices are the result of a trade-o⁄between revenue and strategic trade
goals is necessarily better than a situation in which direct subsidies are allowed for.
Moreover, one might ask, if the world￿ s trade organization banned direct subsidies,
how should indirect subsidies (such as the tax exemption system) be evaluated.
These questions are beyond the scope of the paper, though.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section, the
model setup is described and the market equilibrium is derived. In section 3, tax
policy with given and endogenous transfer prices is analyzed. Section 4 discusses
the results and section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Assume a world with three countries, labelled a, b and c. There are two multina-
tional ￿rms (MNFs) with their headquarters in countries a and b, respectively.
Each of the two MNFs has an a¢ liate in country c and produces a homogeneous
good x which is sold to consumers in country c. Demand in c is denoted by X and
given by X = A ￿ p where p is the price and A is a constant parameter.
Consider ￿rstly the production decisions of the multinational ￿rmheadquartered
in country i. Production of one unit of xi requires one unit labor and one unit
4of capital. The unit cost of labor is given by w in all locations10 and capital is
rented at the world capital market at a constant rate of r. Production takes place
at both locations within the ￿rm, the headquarter in country i and the a¢ liate in
country c. I assume that a fraction ￿ of production is located at the headquarter
and the complement, 1￿￿, at the a¢ liate in country c. This can be interpreted as
the headquarter producing some input good necessary for production in country
c, or as the ￿rm allocating di⁄erent ￿tasks￿across locations (like in Grossman &
Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). For accounting and tax purposes, the foreign a¢ liate has
to ￿buy￿the headquarter part of the production at a transfer price of ￿i. Thus,
the before-tax variable cost at the a¢ liate is given by (1 ￿ ￿)(w + r)+￿￿i and at
the headquarter by ￿(w + r) ￿ ￿￿i.
How are transfer prices determined? I assume that countries a and b - either
cooperatively or uncoordinatedly - choose transfer price guidelines, denoted by ￿ ￿i.
Firms may choose to deviate from the guideline by setting ~ ￿i. Deviating from the
￿o¢ cial￿transfer price ￿xed by the guideline is costly, though, since this deviation
has to be concealed from detection. The concealment cost is assumed to equal
ki
￿









After-tax pro￿ts are then given by
￿i =
h￿









~ ￿i ￿ w ￿ ki
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~ ￿i ￿ ￿ ￿i
￿i
￿xi (1 ￿ ti) ￿ rxi
where ti is the corporate tax in country i, te
i = tc + tr
i (1 ￿ tc) the e⁄ective
tax rate on foreign pro￿ts, tr
i is the repatriation tax and tc the corporate tax in
country c. Under the tax exemption system, tr
i equals zero, and under the tax
credit system, tr
i is equal to
ti￿tc
1￿tc yielding an e⁄ective tax rate on foreign pro￿ts
of te
i = ti. Note that, in the absence of taxes or under the tax credit system, with
te
i = ti, the transfer price does not a⁄ect ￿rm pro￿ts. Throughout the paper, I
assume that tc < ti.
The ￿rm in i maximizes its pro￿ts by strategically setting xi and ~ ￿i. Con-
sider ￿rstly the pro￿t-maximizing choice of the transfer price ~ ￿i. The ￿rst order
10The equality of wages is not crucial for the model results, but simpli￿es notation.





i (1 ￿ ti) (2)
Under the tax credit system, te
i = ti, the ￿rm does not deviate from the transfer
price guideline, ~ ￿i = ￿ ￿i. However, under the exemption system, ti > te
i = tc, k0
i
has to be negative to satisfy the above condition which implies ~ ￿i < ￿ ￿i. The ￿rm
sets a lower transfer price than o¢ cially proposed in order to shift income from
the high-tax headquarter location to the low-tax a¢ liate location.
Now consider the pro￿t-maximizing quantity given by
xi =
A ￿ ￿i ￿ (￿i ￿ ￿j)
3
(3)
where ￿i = w+￿
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j do not depend on the level of ￿ ￿i or ￿ ￿j, see also (2).
The equilibrium price is
p =
A + ￿a + ￿b
3
(4)
It follows that the equilibrium quantity can be expressed as xi = p ￿ ￿i and







It is useful to have a look at how policy choices a⁄ect the equilibrium quantities.
A small increase in tr
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An increase in tr
i has three e⁄ects. Firstly, it increases the capital cost since
capital costs cannot be deducted from the corporate tax base (￿rst term in square
brackets). Secondly, it increases the tax deductions for the transfer price that the
a¢ liate has to pay to the headquarter. This reduces ceteris paribus the variable
cost and increases the equilibrium quantity. Thirdly, an increase in tr
i reduces the
tax gap between the two locations and, thus, reduces the opportunities for pro￿t
6shifting. The net e⁄ect on quantities is positive if the the o¢ cial transfer price is
large enough, i.e. if ￿(￿i ￿ w) > r
1￿ti ￿ ￿
￿
~ ￿i ￿ ￿ ￿i ￿ ki
￿
. Similarly, the impact of
tr




















































If the e⁄ective tax rates on income in both locations are equal, as under the
credit system, the transfer price guideline (which then is the e⁄ective transfer
price) is irrelevant for quantity and prices. However, if there is a di⁄erence in
e⁄ective taxation between the headquarter and the a¢ liate in c, an increase in the
transfer price leads to an increase in variable cost and, thus, decreases equilibrium
quantity. The reason is that an increase in ￿i increases heavily taxed headquarter
income and reduces lightly taxed a¢ liate income (without changing the sum of
pre-tax income). Similarly, an increase in the transfer price of country j increases










￿ 0, if it increases
the variable cost of the ￿rm in j.
3 Welfare and optimal policy choices
The literature on optimal foreign income taxation usually assumes that the gov-
ernment￿ s objective is to maximize national income. Its focus is on the optimal
tax on foreign income given the corporate tax rates at home and abroad. Thus,
taxation in this literature is neither about redistribution nor about public good
provision11 but rather about correcting for allocative distortions due to corporate
tax rate di⁄erences. Here, I adopt these assumptions. Accordingly, national wel-
fare is assumed to be the sum of ￿rm pro￿ts and tax revenue where the former is
11Note that if national income maximization is the government￿ s objective the case for raising
tax revenue is rather low compared to the cases in which funds are to be redistributed or used for
public goods provision. Thus, the assumption makes exemption as an optimal policy outcome
more likely.
7given in (1) and the latter by
Ti = t
r
i (1 ￿ tc)
h￿
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xi (7)
Thus, welfare in country i equals
Wi =
￿￿
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￿
tc+ki￿ ￿ 0 denotes the social cost due to pro￿t shift-
ing. Taxes levied by country i do not occur since they just redistribute funds from
the private to the public sector which has no welfare implication, by assumption.
The transfer price guideline ￿ ￿i only plays a role if there is a non-zero corporate tax
in the third market c (recall that ￿
g
i is independent of the level of ￿ ￿i, see equation
(2)).
Before I analyze optimal policy choices, it is worthwhile to consider how the
benevolent government would like the ￿rm to set its choices in comparison to how
it actually sets it. The answer to this question is straightforward with regard to
pro￿t shifting. As ￿
g
i > 0, the government wants the ￿rm to shift no pro￿ts at
all. In terms of quantity, the picture is more complex. For purpose of illustration,
assume that the government can force the ￿rm to marginally increase its quantity.











































By increasing xi, the government acts as a Stackelberg leader and forces the
￿rm in j to reduce its quantity. This leads to an increase in p as
@p
@xj = ￿1. This
e⁄ect has been analyzed in a three country model by Brander & Spencer (1985). In
their framework, this e⁄ect provides the rationale for subsidizing production (via
an export subsidy). The second e⁄ect is due to taxation. In the presence of taxes,
￿rm choices have an e⁄ect on the government budget which is not accounted for by
8￿rms. Production is therefore ine¢ ciently low. Therefore an increase of production
increases welfare. The third e⁄ect is due to pro￿t shifting opportunities. If pro￿t
shifting decreases variable cost, the ￿rm ceteris paribus produces too much which
ceteris paribus implies negative welfare e⁄ects of production increases.12
In the presence of a su¢ cient number of instruments, the government could
suppress pro￿t shifting and subsidize production in order to maximize national
welfare. However, as outlined in the introduction, production subsidies may not
be available due to international trade agreements. Moreover, the government
may simply lack adequate instruments allowing for suppressing pro￿t shifting at
an acceptable cost. I assume that the only instruments available are the choice
of the system of foreign pro￿t taxation and eventually the choice of transfer price
guidelines.





i, production is either too high or too low. In the absence of pro￿t shifting,
production is ine¢ ciently low. The question is therefore which of the two systems
of taxation pushes the ￿rm closer to the welfare-maximizing behavior. This is to be
examined in the following. The analysis has two parts. In the ￿rst part, I assume
that transfer prices are exogenously given, e.g. by some supranational transfer
price guideline. In the second part, transfer prices can be set non-cooperatively
and coordinatedly by countries i and j.
3.1 Tax policy with given transfer prices
To start with, assume that transfer prices ￿a and ￿b are exogenously given, e.g. due
to some earlier agreement or some supranational institution. Both governments
in a and b simultaneously choose between the two standard systems of foreign
taxation: exemption system and tax credit system. The governments￿purpose
is to maximize national welfare given by (8). Corporate tax rates ta and tb are
assumed to be given, and the government in c is passive. In the following, I will
analyze country i￿ s choice depending on given transfer prices and the choices of
12This e⁄ect has been analyzed in Grubert & Slemrod (1998) and Slemrod (2003).































i are pro￿ts and the pro￿t-maximizing quantity, respectively,
if country i chooses the exemption system, see (3) with te
i = tc. In contrast, welfare
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i are pro￿ts and the pro￿t-maximizing quantity, respectively,
if country i chooses the tax credit system, see (3) with te
i = ti.
Country i chooses the exemption system if W ex > W cr. The welfare di⁄erence






























2 > 0. Thus, the
welfare di⁄erence is a quadratic function of the di⁄erence in variable cost, ￿cr
i ￿￿ex
i .
If the social cost of pro￿t shifting, ￿
g;ex
i , is su¢ ciently small, this function has two
nulls, N1 and N2 (derived in the appendix), both larger than zero. However, if
￿
g;ex




j , ￿ is larger if country j chooses the exemption system, te
j = tj.
This implies that W ex
i ￿W cr




j = tj than under te
j = tc.

















10If ￿ ￿i equals the variable cost at the headquarter, w, the variable cost under
the tax credit system is always higher than the variable cost under exemption.
Only for su¢ ciently large transfer price guidelines, the variable cost di⁄erence can
become negative. Note that the ￿rm￿ s gain from pro￿t shifting does not depend
on the transfer price guideline ￿ ￿i.
Diagram 1 summarizes the results. Suppose that country j applies the exemp-
tion system and that ￿
g;ex
i is su¢ ciently small. Then, if the variable cost under
the credit system is lower or only little larger than the variable cost under the
exemption system, country i prefers the tax credit system (parameter range left
of N1). If the cost di⁄erence becomes larger, country i switches to the exemption
system (parameter range between N1 and N2). At ￿cr
i ￿￿ex
i = N2, it switches back
to the tax credit system (parameter range right of N2). If country j applies the
tax credit system, the nulls are at ~ N1 and ~ N2 which implies a larger parameter
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Diagram 1: Welfare di⁄erence as a function of variable cost di⁄erence.
I can thus state
Proposition 1 Assume that transfer price guidelines are exogenously given and
equal in both countries, ￿ ￿a = ￿ ￿b = ￿ ￿. Then, a Nash equilibrium exists with both
countries choosing the tax credit system if the social loss due to pro￿t shifting
opportunities under the exemption system ￿
g;ex
i is large. If ￿
g;ex
i is su¢ ciently
small,
i) a Nash equilibrium exists with both countries choosing the tax credit system
if ￿cr
i ￿ ￿ex
i < ~ N1 and ￿cr
i ￿ ￿ex
i > ~ N2.
11ii) a Nash equilibrium exists with both countries choosing the tax exemption
system if N1 < ￿cr
i ￿ ￿ex
i < N2.
iii) no equilibrium in pure strategies exists if ~ N1 < ￿cr
i ￿ ￿ex
i < N1 and N2 <
￿cr
i ￿ ￿ex
i < ~ N2.
One may summarize the above proposition as follows. In the absence of intra-
￿rm trade, ￿ = 0, the exemption system is optimal. In the presence of intra-￿rm
trade and if transfer price guidelines are close to actual costs at the headquarter
location, see equation (14), the exemption system is an optimal policy choice and
the equilibrium strategy as long as pro￿t shifting opportunities are not too large.
If transfer price guidelines are used to shift a fair amount of taxable income to the
headquarter location (i.e. if transfer prices are su¢ ciently large), it is likely that
the tax credit system is an optimal policy choice in both countries.
3.2 Tax policy with endogenous transfer prices
So far, I have assumed that transfer price guidelines are given. This may be a
plausible assumption since countries agree on international transfer price guidelines
which may have quasi-legal status in trade frameworks like the WTO. However,
countries may have some discretion in setting the transfer price guidelines whether
due to incomplete international arrangements or discretionary ranges allowed for
in these arrangements. For this purpose, I assume that countries a and b can set
the transfer price guidelines. Country c is supposed to have no means to dispute
the guidelines13 as long as there is a non-negative tax base in country c, i.e. as





























































13This assumption is further discussed in section 4.
12with
@xi








. Thus, the optimal transfer price guideline results from
a trade-o⁄between shifting taxable income to the domestic jurisdiction (and, thus,
save foreign tax payments, see the ￿rst term) and distorting the cost of production
(second term). This trade-o⁄ di⁄ers according to the system of foreign pro￿t
taxation.
Under the tax credit system, the quantity does not depend on the transfer
price,
@xi
@￿ ￿i = 0. Thus, the government in country i shifts all pro￿ts out of country
c by charging the highest possible transfer price, ￿ ￿
max
i , which implies pro￿ts of
￿i =
h￿





(1 ￿ ti) and tax revenue of Ti = ti ((p ￿ w)xi ￿ Fi)
where xi and p are given in (3) and (4), respectively.
Under the exemption system, country i￿ s optimal transfer price depends on
country j￿ s choice of the tax system. The appendix shows that, if country j
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Thus, the choice of ￿ ￿i depends on the tax systems choice in both countries






, of which the latter is of crucial
importance. It follows directly from the two above equations that tc > ti=4 is a
su¢ cient condition for the optimal transfer price guideline to exceed the variable
cost at the headquarter: ￿ ￿i > w. The larger the ￿rm￿ s gain and the social loss
due to pro￿t shifting, the higher the optimal ￿ ￿i. To understand the relationship
between tc and the optimal transfer price, recall that the transfer price has two
main e⁄ects. Firstly, the transfer price can be used to manipulate the variable cost
13which is similar to a production subsidy. This e⁄ect becomes the more important
the higher the tax gap ti ￿ tc, i.e. the lower the foreign tax rate tc. Secondly, the
transfer price shifts income from the foreign tax base to the domestic tax base.
From the domestic perspective, this is the more important the higher the foreign
tax rate tc. In other words, if the tax rate in country c is low, transfer pricing is
aggressive and competition oriented; if the tax rate in country c is high, transfer
pricing is tax revenue oriented.
Now, consider the choice between the exemption and the tax credit system.
This choice is di⁄erent from the choice analyzed in the preceding section: The ￿rm
either chooses exemption and the transfer price in (17) or (18), or the tax credit










Under exemption, national welfare is given by (11). In contrast, under the tax
credit system, national welfare is given by W cr
i = (p ￿ w ￿ r)xi ￿ Fi. Welfare
does not depend on the tax rate in country c, since all taxable income is shifted
out of country c. The country has no opportunity to use transfer prices to subsidize
production, however it can shift all income out of country c without deteriorating
the terms of trade of its ￿rm.
Proposition 2 Assume that transfer prices and tax regimes are simultaneously
and uncoordinatedly chosen by both countries a and b. Then,
i) if tc approaches zero, both countries choose the exemption system;
ii) if the foreign tax rate approaches ti, both countries prefer the tax credit
system.
Proof. Assume tc = 0. Then, under the tax credit system, the transfer price
has no impact on welfare. Under an exemption system, country i can replicate
the welfare level of the tax credit system by setting an adequate transfer price
(at N1 or ~ N1, respectively, in diagram 1). However, changing the transfer price
may increase welfare even higher. Thus, the welfare under the exemption system
can be increased by setting lower transfer prices (and, thus, increase ￿cr
i ￿ ￿ex
i ).
If tc increases, the ￿rst term in (17) and (18) decrease whereas the second terms
increase. If tc approaches ti, ￿i will at some point reach its maximum level given by
￿
max
i (due to the term ti￿tc in the denominator). As shown in the preceding section,
a su¢ cient condition for a country to prefer the credit system is ￿cr
i ￿ ￿ex
i < 0
14which implies ￿ ￿i > w + r
￿(1￿ti) ￿
￿
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su¢ ces to show that ￿
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ki (1 ￿ ti) in
order to prove that, for high levels of tc, the preferred tax system is the tax credit




















(1 ￿ tc) which is necessarily true for high levels of tc
approaching ti.
Thus, countries choose the credit system if income shifting to the domestic tax
base is more important (i.e. if tc is large) and the exemption system if subsidization
is more e⁄ective (i.e. if tc is low).
3.3 Extension: Tax rate choice of country c
So far, I have assumed that country c is passive and does not respond to the policy
choices of countries a and b. However, the model results have shown that optimal
policy choices with endogenous transfer prices crucially depend on the tax policy
choice of c, the tax rate tc. For reasons discussed above, I have assumed that
countries a and b consider their corporate tax rates as given, and it is natural to
apply the same assumption to country c. In fact, tax competition over corporate
tax rates has been extensively analyzed in the literature, in symmetric settings
(countries a and b) and asymmetric settings (countries c and a=b). Replicating
this kind of analysis is not likely to yield new insights. It is, however, tempting
to ask whether country c has an incentive to trigger certain policy responses by
country a and b by setting its tax rate before a and b choose their system of foreign
pro￿t taxation and the transfer price guidelines.
Therefore assume that country c acts as a Stackelberg leader and determines
its tax rate tc anticipating the other countries￿policy choices on te
a, te
b, ￿ ￿a, ￿ ￿b.
As indicated above, both countries a and b choose their system of foreign pro￿t
taxation according to a trade-o⁄ between production subsidization and income
shifting out of country c. Whereas production subsidies bene￿t the economy in
c because consumer surplus increases, income shifting reduces the country￿ s tax
revenue. In other words, subsidizing production by country i harms country j
and bene￿ts country c, whereas income shifting under the tax credit system does
15not a⁄ect country j but harms country c. Therefore, country c clearly prefers the
other two countries to implement the exemption system.
Proposition 3 If country c is allowed to adjust its tax rate tc, the resulting equi-
librium implies both countries a and b choosing the exemption system.
Proof. If tc is large, both countries a and b choose the tax credit system and
country c has zero tax revenue and consumer prices of p(te
i = ti). If tc is low,
countries a and b choose the exemption system and country c has zero or positive
tax revenue and consumer prices of p(te
i = tc). Since tax revenue cannot become
negative and because p(te
i = tc) < p(te
i = ti), it follows that country c always
chooses a tax rate which ensures a tax exemption equilibrium.
This result stands in contrast to the standard literature where the low-tax
country may pro￿t from tax credit system employed by the high-tax country. The
reason is that the low-tax country may then increase its tax rate without distorting
the incentives for the foreign owned capital.
4 Discussion
As every model, the above presented model is based on a number of simplifying
assumptions. In the following, I will discuss three of these simpli￿cations and their
implications for the model results.
Firstly, I assumed for most of the model analysis that country c remains passive,
especially in terms of transfer pricing policies. In the real world, transfer prices
are negotiated between the two parties which are directly concerned: the residence
country and the host country. Other residence countries (like country j in the
model) are a⁄ected by the outcome of these negotiations but do not participate.
Assuming that the host country is passive is equivalent to assuming that it has no
negotiation power. This greatly simpli￿es the analysis but, as I will argue here,
does not substantially restrict the results in their generality. On the one hand,
in many cases the residence country has incentives to allow for pro￿t shifting to
the low tax host country in order to subsidize production. On the other hand, if
the host country has negotiation power this would simply imply that the highest
16possible transfer price is reduced. This does not a⁄ect the results derived in section
3.2, though.
Secondly, I assumed that the ￿rm￿ s headquarter and a¢ liate act as one player.
There are not principle-agent or management control problems involved. As poin-
ted out by Elitzur & Mintz (1996) and Koethenbuerger (2010), transfer pricing
may be used by the headquarter to incentivize managers at the a¢ liate location.
For instance, in order to reduce the risk of empire-building behavior, transfer prices
may be chosen arti￿cially high. In the cases described above, such a transfer pri-
cing policy gets in con￿ ict with the ￿rm￿ s tax saving purposes. Again, if countries
anticipate this transfer pricing behavior, they may choose o¢ cial transfer prices
accordingly and end up at the transfer price levels as in the current version of the
model. However, additional complexities arise as the a¢ liate part of the ￿rm is
not committed to pro￿t-maximization.
Thirdly, the model considers perfect tax credit systems and perfect exemption
systems. It has often been argued that real world versions of both tax systems
actually are somewhere between the polar cases considered here. Deferral of pro￿t
repatriations undermine the tax credit system, and legislation for controlled foreign
companies (CFC rules) introduce elements of residence taxation into real world
exemption systems. Insofar, the model is not intended to re￿ ect all complexities
of existing tax systems, but rather focus on a major trade-o⁄ between revenue
policy and trade policy which so far has mostly been neglected.
5 Conclusion
This paper started from the observation that explicit subsidies and tari⁄s are
decreasing in importance due to international trade agreements. However, the
tax system o⁄ers subtle means to manipulate the terms of trade for multinational
￿rms, especially if intra-￿rm trade occurs. I built a model in the tradition of
Brander & Spencer (1985) where two ￿rms from di⁄erent countries compete on
a third market. In contrast to the Brander & Spencer (1985) framework, the
￿rms have production facilities in the third market, but nevertheless import a
fraction of their production from the headquarters. This gives rise to intra-￿rm
trade which requires transfer price guidelines for tax reasons. The governments
17of the countries hosting the headquarters have two instruments at their disposal,
the choice of the system of foreign pro￿t taxation and transfer price guidelines.
The paper demonstrates how the two instruments interdepend and what are the
optimal choices under competition.
Firstly, it turns out that, in the absence of intra-￿rm trade both countries
choose the exemption system. This is not a novel result, as it has often been
mentioned in the literature and recent policy documents. As each residence country
would like to subsidize production of its multinational ￿rm, it certainly will not
impose an extra cost on production via the repatriation tax.
Secondly, the picture changes in the presence of intra-￿rm trade, if transfer
prices are exogenously given (e.g. by some international agreement) and ensure
that there is positive taxable income in both locations, the headquarter and the
a¢ liate. If intra-￿rm trade becomes more important, the residence country may
have an incentive to switch to the tax credit system. The reason is that a transfer
price that shifts taxable pro￿ts to the high-tax country increases the variable cost
of the ￿rm if there is a di⁄erence in e⁄ective taxation between the two locations.
The tax credit system closes this tax gap and, thus, ceteris paribus reduces the
variable cost.
Thirdly, if transfer prices are autonomously chosen by the residence countries
a trade-o⁄occurs between extracting income from the source country or implicitly
subsidizing production. If the welfare objective is assumed to be national income,
there is only an incentive to shift income out of the source country if it applies
a positive corporate tax rate. It turns out that optimal transfer prices are below
the variable headquarter cost of production if the source country￿ s corporate tax
rate is low and above if it approaches the corporate tax rate level of the residence
country. The paper shows that, as a consequence, the residence countries prefer
the exemption system for low corporate tax levels in the third country and the tax
credit system otherwise.
Fourthly and ￿nally, if the source country is allowed to adjust its tax rate, it
can be shown that it will choose a corporate tax rate which is su¢ ciently low to
ensure that both residence countries choose the exemption system.
What follows for tax policy? The most important message from the above ana-
lysis is probably that the competitive e⁄ects of the tax credit and the exemption
18system crucially depend on quantity and price of intra-￿rm trade. Moreover, as
also pointed out by Becker & Loomer (2009), transfer pricing may have a sub-
stantial e⁄ect on competition and should be treated accordingly by supranational
competition institutions.
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21Appendix
Appendix 1: Welfare di⁄erence
This appendix derives the two nulls of the welfare di⁄erence function in equation
(13).
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Appendix 2: Optimal transfer pricing guidelines
This appendix derives the expressions in equations (17) and (18).






































































and solving for ￿ ￿i yields
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where I used te
i = tc.
If j chooses credits, the above equation reads
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If j chooses exemption, the above equation reads
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Plugging the above expression for ￿ ￿j in the expression for ￿ ￿i yields
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16(2tc + ti)(2tc + tj) ￿ (4tc ￿ ti)(4tc ￿ tj)
which, under symmetry, reads
￿ ￿i = w +
2(12tc + 3ti)
￿(5t2
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